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ABSTRACT 
Islamic State (IS) terrorist networks in Syria and Iraq pose threats 
to national security. IS’ exploitation of social media and digital 
strategy plays a key role in its global dissemination of 
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. However, systematic 
research on Islamic terrorist communication via social media is 
limited. Our research investigates the question: How do IS 
members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism communication: 
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment?  Theoretically, we 
drew on microeconomic network theories to develop a theoretical 
framework for multi-sided Twitter networks in the global Islamic 
terrorist communication environment. Empirically, we collected 
3,039 tweets posted by @shamiwitness who was identified in 
prior research as “an information disseminator” for the IS cause. 
Methodologically, we performed social network analysis, trend 
and content analyses of the tweet data. We find strong evidence 
for Shamiwitness-intermediated multi-sided Twitter networks of 
international mass media, regional Arabic mass media, IS fighters, 
and IS sympathizers, supporting the framework’s utility.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
J.4. [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences –
Communication. J.1 [Computer Applications]: Administrative 
Data Processing – government. H.4 [Information Systems]: 
Information Systems. H.1.1 [Systems and Information]: Value of 
information 
General Terms 
Strategy, Communication, Performance. 
Keywords 
Twitter, terrorism communication, propaganda, radicalization, 
recruitment, Islamic extremism, Islamic State, @shamiwitness, 
social network analysis, global social networks, multi-sided 
networks. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
President Barack Obama earlier referred to Islamic State (IS) – 
Islamic terrorist networks of predominantly Sunni Muslim 
extremists, foreign fighters, and sympathizers – as a “Junior 
Varsity” version of Al Qaeda” [25, p. 1]. Since then the rapid rise 
and resilience of the IS militants in Syria and Iraq against the US-
led coalition of 60-plus nations, however, seems to pose a serious 
threat. Furthermore, IS seems to deploy social media platforms 
effectively and strategically for terrorism communication; namely 
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. In this research, we 
hold that a much greater threat may be posed by the IS multi-
ethnic military force powered by IS strategic use of multi-sided 
Twitter networks in “the new digital age” [54, p.4]. 
There are two reasons for our concerns. First, both al-Qaeda and 
IS hold the political goal of establishing a new Islamic state (or 
“caliphate”) where Sharia law is the highest authority and jihad is 
sanctioned. Importantly, while Osama bin Laden, leader of al-
Qaeda, failed to achieve this political goal during his lifetime, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghadi, leader of IS, in Mosul, Iraq on July 4, 2014, 
proclaimed himself as “Caliph Ibrahim”.  Al-Baghadi proclaims 
that he has the absolute power under Allah over the “Islamic 
State” and all Muslims on earth, inciting them to obey him in 
waging global jihad against all Allah’s enemies [2]. This is an 
open call for extreme political violence as the duty of all faithful 
Muslims, not only against infidels (those who are unfaithful to 
Islam), but also against Shia Muslims and moderate Sunni 
Muslims. Immediately, Sunni-ruled Jordan declared IS as a 
“direct and immediate threat to our national security” [5, p. 1]. 
Similarly, Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia expressed a view that Abu 
Bakr al-Baghadi’s efforts to create a multi-ethnic military force 
under the banner of his Islamic fundamentalism ideology and 
polity as a serious threat to national security [4]. These threat 
perceptions of the regional powers echo those of the Western 
nations, having resulted in 60-plus members of the anti-Islamic 
State coalition in September, 2014 to fight against the IS military 
force in Syria and Iraq [45].  
Second, while al-Qaeda also exploited mass media and the 
Internet for terrorism propaganda [12, 13], IS exploits the 
explosive speed and increasing reach of global social media 
platforms in luring hearts and minds of younger generations of the 
Muslims and the Westerners alike to fight with its IS multi-ethnic 
force in Syria and Iraq to extend the political power and 
dominance of the “Islamic State” worldwide. A 2014 United 
Nations Security Council report shows that 15,000 foreign 
fighters from more than 80 countries are fighting with the IS in 
Syria and Iraq [3]. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
however, gives higher estimates of 20,000 – 31,500 fighters in 
Syria and Iraq [1]. These statistics seem to indicate that IS can 
recruit continuous flows of new fighters to wage war against the 
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US-led coalition with 60-plus nations as well as against Kurdish 
fighters and Iraqi military force, although the Pentagon claims that 
US-led air strikes killed several hundred IS fighters in and around 
the Syrian town of Kobane in October, 2014 [41].  
Despite the potential greater threat posed by the IS’ overarching 
political goal of the worldwide Islamic State, military capability, 
and exploitation of Twitter networks in terrorism communication, 
however, there is a clear paucity of scientific research – both 
theoretical and empirical research – on social media use by IS. 
Therefore, we address a central research question in this research: 
How do IS members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism 
communication: propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment? In 
answering this research question we strategically selected the 
Twitter account of @shamiwitness. Prior research [16, 33] has 
identified “Shami Witness” as someone who had been closely 
linked to the IS terror networks.  On December 13, 2014, Mehdi 
Masroor Biswas behind this popular and prolific @shamiwitness 
was arrested by Indian police for spreading the views of Islamic 
State [9, 60]. We collected a sample of 3,039 tweets posted by 
@shamiwitness during the period of October 6 to October 27, 
2014. We then performed a social network analysis of this tweet 
dataset to examine the emergent structure of connectedness and 
communication content of the Twitter networks formed by 
@shamiwitness and his followers.  
Since terrorism is multi-faced, there exist different definitions in 
the literature. However, in this research we adapt the 2012 US 
Department of Defense (DOD) definition of terrorism as the use 
of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to implant and 
spread fear so as to coerce or politically influence governments 
and/or citizens in the pursuit of goals which are political, 
religious, and/or ideological [64]. In other words, we distinguish 
terrorism from terrorizing (e.g., terrorizing the public through 
random violence by an individual or a group with mental health 
problems).  
The structure of this paper is organized as follows: the next 
section presents our research background on the Islamic State and 
@shamiwitness.  Drawing on a review of the relevant literatures, 
in the third section, we discuss a theoretical framework for 
examining two emergent social media-enabled structural 
mechanisms that amplify terrorism communication in the context 
of radical Islamic terrorist networks.  In the fourth section, we 
describe our research methods. In the fifth section, we present key 
research findings. In the sixth section, we discuss the socio-
political and socio-technical implications of our key findings that 
may improve the government practice in countering social media-
enabled terrorism communication towards safeguarding the 
national security and contributing to the political order of the 
Middle East. Finally, the seventh section presents our conclusions, 
including the research limitations of this paper and the future 
research directions for social media-enabled terrorism 
communication in e-government research field.    
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Islamic State  
Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (IS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), has 
its origin in al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which engaged in the Iraqi 
insurgence against the 2003 US-led invasion to oust Saddam 
Hussein during the Iraq War [35]. The US lists IS as a 
predominantly Sunni terrorist and jihadist group. 
Abu Bakr al-Baghadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad 
Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, hailed from Samarra, in the Sunni Triangle 
north of Baghdad, which was heavily affected by US bombing 
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, AQI, and 
the insurgency [24].   
As stated in our Introduction section, al-Baghadi claims that a 
caliphate – a single, transnational “Islamic State” based on sharia 
has been established. Despite the US-led coalition airstrikes 
against the IS positions, IS controls a large part of Iraq including 
Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. The area (in solid orange 
color) in Figure 1 shows a sizable part of Iraq and Syrian border 
under the control of IS and IS support (as of January, 2015) [8].  
The confirmed airstrikes by US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq 
since June, 2014 are shown by dark blue bubble, where the size 
shows the number of strikes. On the map below, the 4th largest 
bubble (40 strikes) at the bottom right corner indicates the number 
of airstrikes in and around Baghdad, while the largest bubble (600 
strikes) at the top left corner indicates that in and around Kobane. 
A total of 880 in Iraq and a total of 665 strikes in Syria were 
conducted by US-led coalition, including the regional Sunni-ruled 
nations [8]. 
IS control IS support Kurdistan Government 
Administered 
Confirmed airstrikes as of January 2015 
 
          600            300        100      40      20 
 
Figure 1. IS control of Syria and Iraq [8] 
IS has been reported as “the world’s richest terrorist group” and 
“controls more firepower and territory than any jihadist 
organization in history” [55, p. 8].  IS has seized control of bank 
assets in Mosul, took control of Syria’s largest oil field, and 
generates the illegal revenue of up to $3 million crude oil sales per 
day [36].  However, a new and emergent threat of Islamic State is 
the dynamic capability of IS, through strategic use of Twitter 
networks in the new digital age, to connect globally with younger 
generations of Muslim and Western would-be terrorist fighters 
and sympathizers and to lure them to support its IS multi-ethnic 
military force through terrorism communication: political 
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment.  
Despite the 1,545 confirmed airstrikes against the IS positions as 
of January, 2015 [8], a 2014 United Nations Security Council 
report shows that 15,000 foreign fighters from more than 80 
countries are fighting with the IS in Syria and Iraq [3].  The 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, gives higher 
estimates 20,000 – 31,500 fighters in Syria and Iraq [1].  
2.2 Shamiwitness 
In their research on Syrian foreign fighter networks, Carter et al. 
[16] examined 2,405 Twitter users whom foreign fighters on 
Twitter followed, during the observation period of nearly 12 
months, ending February, 2014. This generated a social-media 
network of 2,405 nodes. Of this network, 1,778 (or 74%) of 
Twitter users were followed by only one foreign fighter, whereas 
a minority of 46 (or 1.9%) attracted 10 or more followers. Of the 
46, 32 Twitter users were more closely examined. Unsurprisingly, 
the study failed to find any official Twitter account that had been 
registered by any known terrorist group. Importantly, however, 
the study found that @shamiwitness had the great number of 
followers, and hence Carter et al. [16] considered Shamiwitness as 
the most popular and influential Twitter user to the foreign 
fighters in Syria. 
Carter et al. [16, p. 15] identified Shamiwitness as one of “the 
new information disseminators” who “were not foreign fighters 
nor do they have any official links to jihadist organizations. 
Instead, they broadly support the Islamist project in Syria, and in 
that respect, provide both moral and political support to the cause 
by establishing themselves as reliable sources of information.” 
However, they did not provide any information content generated 
by @shamiwitness.  Therefore, it is unclear about a detailed 
communication strategy or mechanism through which 
@shamiwitness provides both moral and political support to the 
IS cause.  
Of the most popular and influential Twitter users listed in their 
report, all but the @shamiwitness account has been shut down by 
Twitter prior to our observation period beginning October 6, 
2014. Finally, Twitter closed the @shamiwitness account upon his 
arrest on December 13, 2014 but took the unprecedented action to 
reinstate the account for archival access. In his Twitter profile, 
@shamiwitness attempts to underscore his independence from 
Islamic State terrorist networks: “RTs ≠ endorsements.”  At this 
point, although it remains unclear whether or not he is a card-
carrying member of IS terrorist networks, his arrest indicates that 
his Twitter networks were viewed by Indian Police as having 
produced value to IS terrorist networks. 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 2 below shows our theoretical framework for examining 
multi-sided Twitter networks in the global Islamic terrorist 
communication environment that can amplify terrorism 
communication effectiveness. We submit that the structural 
mechanisms reshape the core communication operations of 
Islamic terrorist networks; namely terror propaganda, 
radicalization of Islamic religion, and recruitment of new jihadists 
and fighters to accomplish terrorism goals. In this research we 
centrally focus on global multi-sided Twitter networks in 
terrorism communication, without direct reference to the 
accomplishment of the terrorist goals. In this section we explain 
each construct identified in this theoretical framework. 
 
Figure 2. Framework for multi-sided Twitter networks in the 
global Islamic terrorist communication environment 
3.1 Social Media Use by Terrorist Networks 
Historically, terrorist networks have used various media, and 
recently, the Internet, as propaganda and recruitment instruments 
for terrorist activities [12, 13, 18, 30, 43, 66]. The Internet 
websites, the globalization of communications via emails, smart 
phones and tablets, among other ICT tools, and the digitization of 
media, however, have radically reshaped the structure and 
capability of terrorism communication. Importantly, using the 
Internet, terrorist networks have overcome the limitations of 
traditional mass media publishing; they have gained greater 
control over a quick, inexpensive, and anonymous means of 
terrorism communication, through which their political, religious, 
or ideological messages can reach new audiences around the 
world [18].  
Using social media platforms, especially Twitter and Facebook, 
with 284 million and 1.35 billion monthly active users worldwide 
(in the 3rd quarter 2014), respectively [57, 58], the terrorism 
communication landscape can be radically reshaped by the speed, 
reach, affordance, and ease of uploading voice, text and imagery 
data via mobile devices for immediate visualization effects. It has 
been reported that terrorist networks [59] and lone wolf terrorists 
[17] alike have seized an unprecedented opportunity to engage 
wider audiences with their extremist ideologies and terrorism 
actions. The Syrian Civil War against the Shia-dominated Bashar 
al-Assad government has been powered by social media use by 
foreign fighters: “Already, considered the most socially mediated 
conflict in history.” [16, p. 7].  
3.2 Multi-Sided Twitter Networks 
Social-media networks are computer-mediated virtual 
communities formed by users/account holders of a social media 
platform, such as Twitter, to share information, common interests, 
needs, or purposes. For example, a social-media network of 
@shamiwitness is formed by his posting a tweet when it is replied 
or re-tweeted by another Twitter account holder. On the voluntary 
basis, some of these network members produce user-generated 
information content, including text, voice and imagery data, for 
the use and the re-use by other network members. In this regard, 
social-media networks behave much like other network goods, 
such as mobile-phone networks, digital-TV networks, eBay, 
Skype, and DropBox. 
Network goods are normally subject to network effects [31]. 
Positive network effects are present when a user’s benefit from a 
product/service depends not only on product/service 
characteristics but also on the network [size] of other users who 
also adopt or use the same product/service [19].  Prior research 
distinguishes intrinsic benefits that arise from product/service 
characteristics from extrinsic benefits that derive from actions of 
others [11, 53]. 
Entrepreneurs of technology platforms and network goods who 
play an intermediary role and create value primarily by enabling 
interactions and information exchanges between two (or more) 
distinct types of affiliated consumers are referred to as two-sided 
networks (or multi-sided platforms) in microeconomic literature 
[19, 22]. These information intermediaries normally have several 
levers of control influencing managing product/service design and 
the intensity of network effects [11]. 
Prior research on network goods would suggest that one strategy 
network platform owners, such as Twitter, and/or individual 
network operators, such as @shamiwitness, can pursue to increase 
users’ benefits is (1) by controlling network operations to  
increase intrinsic benefits through enhanced information quality, 
reputation, and other value-added services to attract new account 
holders (network size) and (2) by increasing extrinsic benefits. In 
order to increase the extrinsic benefits, @shamiwitness, for 
example, can entice his social-media network users to actively 
engage by issuing their own tweets, replying to his tweets or 
retweeting his tweets to their own “followers” (who are not 
members of the @shamiwitness network but belong to separate 
social-media networks). Therefore, for a network good whose 
product/service quality is shaped by the actions of other users (the 
network effect) [11], the value of the @shamiwitness Twitter 
account seems to be a function of content and information quality 
he himself produces and of those his social-media network users 
co-produce. In other words, the value creation process is dynamic 
and interactive in nature, and we submit that the value seems to be 
co-produced by the entire social-media network that is ever 
dynamically changing. In other words, social media platforms are 
necessary but not sufficient to create such value; social network 
operators’ strategy and uers’ actions matter. 
Network effects can operate in a one-sided network of users, such 
as, Skype, where network users have only a user role in the 
network) or in cross-sided (two-sided or multi-sided) networks. In 
the case of two-sided networks [20, 27], there are two distinct 
populations of users who form networks, and a user’s benefits in 
one network are dynamically influenced by the size of the cross 
network. For example, digital-TV networks represent two-sided 
network goods [47], where a network of digital-TV network users 
may be deeply interested in the size and actions of the cross 
network of developers. Moreover, a one-sided network good can 
evolve into a two-sided network. For example, YouTube, a single-
sided network good of users differentiates two roles each of which 
forms a different network of content viewers or content providers. 
The value of the network of YouTube viewers is created not by 
other viewers but by the cross network of content providers. 
Similarly, LinkedIn evolved from a one-sided network of 
professionals to a two-sided network of professionals and 
corporations. 
In this new and complex eco-systems of two-sided and multi-
sided networks [22, 47], new roles of information intermediaries 
have emerged to aggregate benefits of different network users [11, 
34]. While prior research [16, p. 14] has described the role played 
by @shamiwitness as one of “the new information disseminators” 
who “were not foreign fighters nor do they have any official links 
to jihadist organizations”. 
 
3.3 Terrorist Propaganda 
Propaganda is a major output of many terrorist networks and a 
long-standing priority for Al Qaeda [56]. Propaganda is defined as 
“information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to 
promote a political cause or point of view” [44]. Terrorist 
networks use campaigns of terrorist violence as “the propaganda 
of the deed” [14, p. 364] or the propaganda by the ([violent] deed) 
to achieve operational-level tactics at global and local levels. On 
the one hand, terrorist networks use the propaganda by the 
[violent] deed targeted against society at the global level: 
• To spread fear [63] 
• To intimidate Western public opinion [48, 61]  
• To support the moral legitimacy of terrorism violence [52]  
• To engage wider audiences with terrorism ideologies and 
actions and to shift their perspectives [59] - for example, by 
reframing suicide attacks as martyrdom operations [15]  
On the other hand, they use terrorist propaganda targeted largely 
towards the Islamic populations (1.5 billion worldwide) at the 
local level:  
• To generate support within the Muslim communities [61] and a 
target population [14]  
• To establish an emotional connection with the targeted audience 
[51]  
• To provide collective identity that motivates terrorism violence 
[48] and to cultivate an identity as fighters of the jihad [62]  
• To promote common knowledge of terrorism ideologies and 
violence in the decentralized, loosely networked structure of 
today's global jihadist organizations [28] 
 
As the list above indicates, we can identify at least two categories 
of the target of the propaganda by the deed: external (the first 
four) vis-à-vis internal (the last four) networks of people, from a 
perspective of a terrorist network. The literature also underscores 
the central role of the media in supporting the propaganda by the 
[violent] deed, since terrorism is essentially a political 
communication. In fact, in the digital age, the increasing 
symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists has been 
examined [21, 48] and the effective use of media-jihad by al-
Qaeda [63].  
In the new digital age, the impact of the propaganda by the deed 
could be greatly amplified through the social media platforms 
such as YouTube and Facebook that support easy uploads of user-
generated content such as extremely violent videos and 
photographs. Furthermore, Twitter has been used to drive 
terrorism communications over other social media platforms 
among the jihadists in Syria and Iraq [33].  
While the literature on social media use in terrorism is still new, 
the question of who controls access and content of social-media 
networks on Twitter is mixed. As discussed earlier in our 
Background section, Carter et al. (2014) [16] view 
@shamiwitness as playing a role of information disseminator for 
Islamic State terrorist networks. In a study of Twitter use by 59 
Western fighters in Syria from January through March 2014, 
social network analysis indicates the controlling role played by 
feeder accounts belonging to terrorist organizations in the 
insurgency zone, and by Europe-based organizational accounts 
[33]. 
3.4 Radicalization  
Radicalization refers to increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, 
and behaviors in support of political violence in a context of 
strong group identification and response to perceived threat to the 
in-group [39]. Based on this definition, we can argue that 
extremism Islamic propaganda can radicalize, for example, the 
target young Islamic males by strengthening the in-group 
identification (e.g., radical Sunni Muslims) and hatred against 
other groups, and by magnifying the external threats from other 
groups (e.g., political and moral decay of the US and oppressive 
Shia-ruled Syria’s Assada administration). Terrorist networks also 
attempt to radicalize the population by attacking a government 
and provoking a counterterrorism response [14]. IS in particular 
through its online recruitment magazine, Dabiq, to have glorified 
a self-claimed preacher, Man Haron Monis as “as one of the 
jihadists ("mujahidin") of the Islamic State” [42]. A lone wolf, 
Monis, demanded a black flag of IS and killed two of his hostages 
during his Sydney siege [23]. Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, 
the official spokesman for the Islamic State (IS) incites random 
“lone wolf” jihad attacks against citizens of US-led coalition 
nations: "If you can kill a disbelieving American or European - 
especially the spiteful and filthy French - or an Australian, or a 
Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging 
war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a 
coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill 
him in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for 
anyone's advice and do not seek anyone's verdict." [42, p. 1]. 
Despite the limited empirical studies on individual processes of 
Islamic radicalization, extant case studies and newspaper articles 
seem to indicate two plausible pathways to radicalization: (1) 
political influence of extremist Islamic preachers or spiritual 
leaders [10, 38, 40], terrorist training, and combat experience in a 
physical environment [29, 40] and (2) “virtual terrorist 
radicalization” via YouTube [6] characterized by violent 
propaganda in a virtual community of hatred and violence through 
the Internet [12, 48, 50] and Twitter [33]. Pisoiu (2013) argues for 
the importance of intentional and developmental factors, including 
the emergence of new trans-cultural identities and generational 
change [37, 46] and social experiences and discursive interactions 
[65], rather than the traditional focus on socioeconomic and 
structural factors such as economic and political grievance, to 
more comprehensively understand violent Islamic radicalization. 
Given only 20% of the radicalized terrorists were influenced by 
extremist Islamic preachers or spiritual leaders, the potential 
threat from the online radicalization process through social media 
in the new digital age needs to be better understood for effective 
public policy approaches.  
 
3.5 Terrorist Recruitment  
Islamic terrorist recruitment refers to enticing young, similarly 
situated people to engage in terrorizing and fighting the Islamic 
jihad war [32]. Despite his family background (Jewish father and 
Catholic mother), Adam Yahiye Gadahn, a 25-year-old American, 
converted to Islam at the age of 17 and adopted increasingly 
radical political views through the close associations with radical 
Islamic spiritual leaders [40]. Gadahn was recruited by al-Qaeda 
and later became active on YouTube as a leading voice of As-
Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm, with violent threats against 
Americans on streets [40].   
While hard-core members such as Gadahn are rarely recruited via 
social media, the explosive growth of Internet penetration rate, 
social media penetration rate, and estimated 1.5 billion Muslim 
population worldwide, together with the on-going political 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, and African nations, terrorist 
networks exploit social media platforms such as Twitter, 
YouTube, MySpace and Facebook and new youth cultures to 
recruit new members and new jihad war fighters [40]. However, 
there is a lack of academic research on online terrorist recruitment 
using social media platforms in the literature.  
In contrast, there are numerous mass media reports on 
sophisticated use of social media by IS fighters in Syria and Iraq 
to recruit new fighters and promote terrorist messages of violence 
via Twitter, YouTube and Facebook [49]. This may be explained 
by the ABC report on the presence of a media arm of IS with a 
sophisticated digital strategy for increased visibility, global 
dissemination of propaganda, magnified image of power and 
threat, and enhanced attractiveness of IS for recruitment [49].  
As Adam Yahiye Gadahn played the propaganda role of a 
modern-day Tokyo Rose for al-Qaeda’s media arm on YouTube 
[40], many of the estimated 3,000 Western IS fighters with their 
own Facebook and Twitter accounts are reported to be playing a 
similar role in influencing and shifting political views in their 
countries of origin [49]. 
With the advent of social media platforms, especially YouTube 
and Facebook, which support easy uploads of user-generated 
content such as videos and photographs, the visualization of 
terrorism violence, which is characteristically sensational, can 
provide terrorist networks with a powerful tool for legitimacy and 
efficacy in radicalization and recruitment, as the internet has done 
[7]. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This paper examines the question of how Islamic terrorism 
communication; namely propaganda, radicalization and 
recruitment to terrorist networks, is supported by Twitter 
networks in the hands of self-organizing IS sympathizers and IS 
fighters. We examine this question both theoretically and 
empirically in a specific and emergent research context of the 
rising power of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Research on social 
media use by IS terror networks is new but social media network 
effect in supporting the IS propaganda, radicalization and 
recruitment of new fighters to Syria and Iraq and “lone wolf” 
terrorists to city streets needs our urgent research attention. 
Hence, our central research question is: How do IS 
members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism communication: 
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment?  To answer our 
research question, we first reviewed relevant literatures to develop 
our theoretical framework. We used these following keywords 
“propaganda AND (terrorism or terrorist)”, “radicalization AND 
Islam”, “radicalization AND ‘Islamic extremism’” and "terrorist 
recruitment" in three comprehensive data bases: Scopus, Web of 
Science and Science Direct. After having removed the 
redundancy, we found 225 articles relevant to this study. After 
careful selection, we analyzed an initial set of 56 articles for the 
development of our theoretical framework.  
We examined the structure of online social media networks that 
have dynamically emerged in the aftermath of US-led coalition 
airstrikes in October, 2014 as our case study. It is extremely 
difficult to identify the IS’s official social media accounts since 
social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have 
policies to suspend the accounts associated with terrorist 
organizations. In this research, therefore, we strategically selected 
to observe the Twitter account of @shamiwitness. Prior research 
[16, 33] has identified “Shamiwitness” as someone who had been 
closely linked to IS terror networks. However, it remains unclear 
whether Shamiwitness is a hard-core member of the IS terror 
networks or a net-savvy sympathizer of IS terror networks. In one 
of his tweets, Shamiwitness has flatly denied his IS membership. 
His Twitter account was suspended on December 13, 2014 and his 
identity and police arrest were widely reported by international 
mass media. Surprisingly, Twitter took the unprecedented step of 
reinstating his Twitter account for archival access.  
Empirically, we analyzed a total of 3,039 tweets posted by 
@shamiwitness during the period from October 6 to October 27, 
2014. We conducted trend analysis, social network analysis, and 
content analysis of these 3,039 tweets. For trend analysis of 
@sshamiwitness’ tweets, we observed the meta-data found in the 
tweets including timestamp of tweets and hashtag that embedded 
in the tweets.  
Through social network analysis, we found 877 unique Twitter 
users directly mentioned either through tweets, retweets or replies 
in the 3,039 tweets. A retweet (RT) refers to an action of 
forwarding other user’s tweet of interest or of importance, while a 
reply refers to an action of answering an inquiry tweet. Both RT 
and reply tweets usually contain the corresponding Twitter user 
name starting with @. By identifying @shamiwitness’ 
followership, in other words, those who follow him, we can 
identify the structure of @shamiwitness social-media network for 
further analysis.  
In the content analysis, we classify the tweet contents into four 
categories: propaganda, radicalization, terrorist recruitment and 
others. Propaganda is defined as information, especially of a 
biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or 
point of view. Radicalization is defined as increasing extremity of 
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict 
and violence.  Very often radicalization occurs in a context of 
group identification and response to perceived threat to the in-
group.  [39]. Terrorist recruitment is defined as enticing other, 
similarly situated young men, to join them in terrorizing and 
fighting the jihad war [32]. For tweets that do not satisfy any of 
these three categories are classified as “others”. 
At this exploratory stage of content analysis, we employed two 
Arabic speaking PhD students from Iraq and one English speaking 
academic as our raters. They all carefully reviewed all of the 
tweets @shamiwitness himself posted but excluded all the 
retweets (RTs).  In the content analysis, we classify the tweet 
contents into four categories: propaganda, radicalization, terrorist 
recruitment and others.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Trend Analysis of @shamiwitness Tweets 
Our analysis finds that 60% of the tweets in the @shamiwitness 
Twitter account represents RTs of tweets posted by other Twitter 
users, including some Arabic tweets. The remaining 40% are his 
own tweets posted entirely in English, except some Arabic 
#hashtags embedded in his English tweets. 
 
Figure 3. Trend analysis: @shamiwitness’ daily posting habit 
Figure 3 shows trend analysis of @shamiwitness’ daily Twitter 
posting habit. In Figure 3, the red line and green line indicate the 
timestamp of the first and last tweet, respectively. Hence, the area 
between the two lines indicates his (potential) daily work hours. 
On average, his daily work hours can be long, stretching out to 16 
hours and 9 minutes per day. As shown in Figure 3, there is not 
much variation in his daily tweeting habit (or routine operation) 
from day to day. This suggests Shamiwitness’ fanatic/diligent 
dedication to operating his @shamiwitness network services like a 
business proposition. It certainly does not look like a hobby for 
him given the level of time and effort put into his Twitter account. 
Figure 4 shows another trend analysis of daily tweets (red line) 
and daily total tweet and retweet (black line) posted by 
@shamiwitness. On average, @shamiwitness posted 57 his own 
tweets and 138 combined tweets and retweets per day, but on  
October 18, 2014 he posted only 24 tweets. Upon being asked by 
other users, he replied in one of his tweets that he had taken an 
administrative leave. Again Figure 4 indicates Shamiwitness’ high 
level of commitment to operating his Twitter network services. 
 
Figure 4. Number of daily tweets by @shamiwitness 
5.2 Multi-Sided Social-Media Networks  
Of the 3,039 tweets we analyzed, there are 877 unique Twitter 
users mentioned by @shamiwitness. Shamiwitness and those 877 
Twitter users formed dynamic social networks through tweet 
exchanges. Figure 5 shows a social network diagram with nodes 
(Twitter users) and links (weak/strong social ties represented by 
tweet exchanges). Figure 5 is the visualization of the tweet 
exchange relationships formed within the @shamiwitness Twitter 
networks. It is a useful research tool to examine the structure of 
his Twitter networks. Figure 5 clearly indicates four distinct 
populations (or networks) of Twitter users: (1) international 
media, (2) regional Arabic media, (3) IS sympathizers, and (4) IS 
fighters. Of the four distinct networks, the network of 
international media is the largest in size, which is measured by the 
number of nodes. Within this network of international media, 
three largest nodes are shown with a red circle whose size is 
computed by the number of followers to that node. In general, the 
larger is the size of a node, the greater is social influence (a 
megaphone effect) of its tweeting or retweeting to its followers 
within a given network. First, the largest network of international 
media shows all well-known media: cnnbrk (CNN Breaking 
News), nytimes (York Times), bbcworld (BBC World), 
washingtonpost (Washington Post) and foreignpolicy (Foreign 
Policy), among others. This network also includes journalists, 
such as jenanmoussa, brown_moses (citizen journalist), policy 
analysts, such as charles_lister and hxhassan, and other 
international entities, which are not directly related to IS. Second, 
a much smaller network of regional media is also detected which 
is characterized by their tweets posted in Arabic. This network 
includes cnnarabic (CNN Arabic), aa_arabic (Anadolu Agency, a 
press agency in Turkey), skynewsarabia_b (Sky News Arabia), 
and ajalive (Al Jazeera). Foreign journalists in posting Arabic 
tweets, such as mousaalomar (Moussa al-Omar) and kasimf 
(Faisal al-Qassem), are also found in this network of regional 
media.  
Third, the second largest network of IS sympathizers (or interest 
groups), behind the network of international media, consists of 
Twitter users who have a special interest in IS. The top of the list 
is of course shamiwitness but the network also includes his close 
associates with whom he often exchanges short coded tweets, 
such as maliwitness, turkwitness, saudiwitness, yemenwitness. 
The network of IS sympathizers also include well-known radical 
Muslim preachers, anjemchoudary and ahmadmusajibril. 
@ahmadmusajibril was specifically mentioned in prior research as 
having close ties with IS terrorist networks [16, 33].  
Finally, the apparently smallest network of IS fighters includes 
Twitter users such as win_or_die2, al_zarkawya_7 and 
alhezbr_23.  Two of the Twitter usernames show an underscore 
“_” followed by version number such as 7 and 23. Many of these 
Twitter accounts have been suspended by Twitter under its policy 
against tweets in support of terrorism or violence. In consequence, 
they open new Twitter accounts by resurrecting their old 
usernames but adding a version number so that their followers and 
friends can recognize their new accounts. This general practice 
among IS fighters whose Twitter accounts were suspended by 
Twitter has been found in many of their tweets to @shamiwitness 
in this research. 
In summary, the social network analysis of the tweet data 
obtained through @shamiwitness has identified strong evidence of 
multi-sided Twitter networks – four distinct networks of different 
populations which used the network service @shamiwitness has 
provided for a fairly long period of time. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Multi-sided Twitter networks of users mentioned in @shamiwitness tweets 
 
5.3 Sample @shamiwitness Tweets 
The examples in Table 1 aim to show Shamiwitness’ 
propaganda, recruitment, and radicalization tweets. As 
previously discussed, propaganda is information, especially of a 
biased or misleading nature, used to promote a particular 
political cause or point of view. For propaganda, this is largely 
intended to magnify the power of IS, with his tweets mock the 
US military miscalculation and inaptitude. Examples shown in 
Table 1 have Shamiwitness saying that the US is killing 
children, massacring civilians, destroying homes, and is too 
fearful to fighting in the streets. His propaganda tweets also 
smear and mitigate media and people’ positive perceptions of 
PKK as brave and loyal to the Kurdistan region of Iraq. We 
selected these earlier dates of our tweet observation period 
because of the intensifying battles around and in Kobane – the 
center of the US-led coalition airstrikes.  
As discussed, radicalization refers to increasing extremity of 
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict 
and violence. The Shamwitness tweets in Table 1 show these 
extreme beliefs. The examples shown ask followers for a call to 
arms, being a warrior, and destruction of people and property.  
All of these tweets display extreme views that support extreme 
political violence. 
Finally, as discussed, terrorist recruitment refers to enticing 
others, similarly situated young men, to join them in terrorizing 
and fighting the jihad war. Understandably, Shami witness has 
been well-aware of security risk by being too explicit in online 
terrorist recruitment. However, we show three examples of 
recruitment from the sample of Shamiwitness tweets. These 
examples show him asking Muslim Kurds in Turkey to join the 
cause, asking another follower to make a “moral” decision, and 
talking about jihad. All of the tweets show the element of 
enticing young men to join Islamic terrorism. 
 
Table 1. @shamiwitness tweet examples: Propaganda, 
Radicalization, and Recruitment 
Timestamp @shamiwitness Tweet 
 Propaganda 
6/10/2014 
10:38 
Coalition planes massacred these children in 
airstrikes on #Hit ,#Anbar 
http://t.co/yCsEgkwDY6#Iraq 
6/10/2014 
17:48 
 
these PKK fellas are exceptional liars.after the 
city was almost fully abandoned by civilians, 
they now claim 55 thousand civilians there. 
7/10/2014 
16:08 
 
This is so awesome. US airstrikes also by mistake 
hit a Shia militia convoy near Tuz 
http://t.co/zUwWcEzBzk 2nd one after the Jabour 
strikes 
8/10/2014 
14:30 
Ask the Americans how they liked fighting 
JTJ/AQI/MSC/ISI in street wars in 
Ramadi,Fallujah etc. (3) 
10/10/2014 
4:13 
 
Amazing thing about Kobane:not a single 
genuine claim of massacres of civilians. Not 
one.Meanwhile, Assad keeps killing kids in 
Aleppo 
 Radicalization 
6/10/2014 
14:45 
 
@Himalaya888 you do realize IS wants to 
destroy every single nation-state,Arab or Kurd or 
communist doesnt matter, that they come across? 
7/10/2014 
18:59 
Real warriors, I mean those who are not fags, 
dont need air support. 
8/10/2014 
12:18 
#IS blows up police station in downtown Kobane 
where YPG were holed up. #Syria 
12/10/2014 
11:18 
 
Notice this recent uptick of IS activity in Qara 
Teppe? multiple VBIEDs [vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device] hitting PUK 
,Pesh,Asayesh ?Guess where else that happened 
earlier? 
 Recruitment 
7/10/2014 
18:21 
This is the time for Muslim Kurds in Turkey to 
show whether they can ever counter PKK. 
7/10/2014 
20:05 
 
@EbuRuana so if it is not right to make dua [the 
Islamic act of calling out to Allah] for a kafir [a 
disbeliever, someone who rejects Allah and who 
does not believe in Muhammad as the final 
messenger of Allah], what is the right thing to do 
? 
11/10/2014 
16:29 
 
@banihillal blend in like you are the most anti-
jihadist guy one can think of. @isinlibya 
@ummussamah11 
12/10/2014 
20:14 
@DaniyalYasin93 The question is to you:can 
you,as a Muslim,counter-argue any of the points 
made in that segment quoted from Dabiq 
magazine [the IS’ propaganda magazine]? 
Notes: [italics] shows our inserted information to help 
contexualize his tweet message. Otherwise we did not edit his 
tweets. 
Note: A Kafir “is a disbeliever, someone who rejects Allah and 
who does not believe in Muhammad as the final messenger of 
Allah” (http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Kafir) 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
  
Results of our social network analysis of Twitter demonstrate 
two important findings. First, social network analysis of Twitter 
uers can be a powerful research tool to discover underlying 
structure and trends in tweet data, which may not be unearthed 
by analyzing traditional media outlets and reports. With Twitter 
an individual with an account is able to spend countless hours, as 
we have seen with @shamiwitness, trying to influence opinions 
of international and regional Arabic mass media, to share some 
common knowledge and newest strategic information with IS 
fighters, and to radicalize and recruit younger generations of 
Muslims and Westerns alike, hence greatly promoting the IS 
cause: the Islamic State as a new global political order. Social 
media can be very empowering for individuals with political 
cause, who may not able to influence traditional media outlets. 
Twitter can be used strategically, as we have shown, to 
orchestrate multi-sided international networks of supporters and 
followers with the explosive speed and reach. 
Second, we showed evidence of using Twitter for propaganda, 
radicalization, and recruitment. Although @shamiwitness tweets 
were carefully posted due to the constant threat of his account 
being shut down, we did provide evidence of using an IS 
member/supporter-mediated Twitter multi-sided networks for 
each of these three activities. This finding shows the extent to 
which a deep understanding of such a multi-sided Twitter 
network structure and competent and strategic operators who can 
exploit such an emergent complex network structure and 
dynamic capability can provide government with a new and 
credible power on the fight against global terrorism. It follows 
that governments need to be more aware that multi-sided social-
media networks can be exploited by global terrorist networks for 
these purposes, and must counter with their own counter-
terrorism digital policy and proactive online campaigns. The 
results show the importance of social media for empowering 
individuals, but it also shows the dark side of social media to 
wage wars and conflict, which would pose a serious threat to 
national security and policy order. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In light of the very limited literature on social media use by 
Islamic terrorism networks in supporting terrorism 
communication, we have examined the sophisticated use of 
Twitter social media platform by Islamic State terrorist networks 
in this paper. By drawing on microeconomic network theories, 
we have developed a theoretical framework for examining multi-
sided Twitter networks in the global Islamic terrorism 
communication environment. Our social network analysis of the 
tweet data generated by @shamiwitness and his Twitter 
followers finds strong evidence of the presence of multi-sided 
Twitter networks which consist of four distinct Twitter user 
populations: international mass media, regional Arabic mass 
media, IS fighters, and IS sympathizers. In these multi-sided 
Twitter networks, Shamiwitness seems to intermediate different 
interests and information needs of these four distinct networks. 
By diligently doing so, he can aggregate values created by each 
network either to his own benefits (e.g., enhanced self 
importance or recognition) or to promoting the global Islamic 
terrorist goals of IS. 
Our research has both theoretical and methodological 
implications for terrorism communication research in our e-
government field. Our research also has policy implications, 
calling urgent attention to the potential power of multi-sided 
Twitter networks in more effectively and more efficiently 
promoting the radical Islamic propaganda, radicalization, and 
recruitment messages to the global audiences. 
However, our research has inherent limitations by focusing on 
@shamiwitness and his Twitter networks. Terrorist networks 
tend to change over time because of changes in operational 
processes such as recruitment and training as well as changes in 
counter-terrorism policies [26]. Future research can apply our 
theoretical framework to further investigate the exploitation of 
Twitter networks by other terrorist networks or the exploitation 
of other social media networks such as YouTube and Facebook 
by Islamic State terrorist networks examining how strategic 
interactions between information reporters and users can affect 
terrorism communication outcomes. 
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